The Postcard
A postcard that was printed in Great Britain and published by Rotary Photo of London E. C. On the back of the card they state:
"This is a Hand-Painted
Photograph of a British
Beauty".
The image is indeed a real photograph.
The card was posted in Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire on Wednesday the 6th. October 1915 to:
Miss N. Miller,
c/o Mrs. Starkey,
School Road,
Chapel End,
Nr. Atherstone,
Warwickshire.
The message on the divided back of the card was as follows:
"Thanks for your
postcard.
I shall be very pleased
with the cloth when it
comes.
Hope you are having a
good time.
Will write to Aunt Alice
in a few days.
Love from
Ella".
Second Battle of Champagne
So what else happened on the day that Ella posted the card?
Well, the 6th. October 1915 was the concluding day of the Second Battle of Champagne on the Western Front during the Great War.
The Second Battle of Champagne was a French offensive against the German army at Champagne that coincided with an Anglo-French assault at north-east Artois and ended with a French retreat.
The Battle
On the 25th. September 1915, twenty divisions of the Second Army and Fourth Army of Groupe d'Armées du Centre (GAC) attacked the Germans at 9:15 a.m., with each division on a 1,500–2,000 yd (1,400–1,800 m) front.
A second line of seven divisions followed, with one infantry division and six cavalry divisions in reserve.
Six German divisions held the line opposite, with the Rückstellung (Reserve Position) further back. French artillery observers benefited from good weather, but on the night of the 24th./25th. September, heavy rain began and fell until midday.
The German front position was broken in four places, and two of the penetrations reached as far as the Rückstellung, where uncut barbed wire prevented the French from advancing further.
In one part of the line, the French artillery barrage continued after the first German line had been taken, causing French casualties.
The French took 14,000 prisoners and several guns, but French casualties were also high; the Germans had anticipated the French attack, having been able to watch the French preparations from the high ground under their control.
The main German defensive effort was made at the Rückstellung, behind which the bulk of the German field artillery had been withdrawn.
A supporting attack by the French Third Army on the Aisne took no ground. German reserves, directed by Falkenhayn, plugged any gaps in the German lines.
The French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre allotted two reserve divisions to the GAC, and ordered the Groupe d'Armées de l'Est (GAE) to send all 75 mm field gun ammunition, except for 500 rounds per gun, to the Second and Fourth armies.
On the 26th. September, the French attacked again, closed up to the Rückstellung on a 7.5 mi (12.1 km) front, and gained a foothold in one place.
Another 2,000 German troops were captured, and attacks against the Rückstellung broke through on the 28th. September.
However a German counter-attack the next day recaptured the ground, most of which was on a reverse slope, which had deprived the French artillery of ground observation.
Joffre suspended the offensive until more ammunition could be supplied, and ordered that the captured ground be consolidated and cavalry units withdrawn. Smaller French attacks against German salients continued from the 30th. September to the 5th. October.
Aftermath of the Battle
On the 3rd. October, Joffre abandoned the attempt at a breakthrough in Champagne, ordering the local commanders to fight a battle of attrition, then terminated the offensive on the 6th. November.
The offensive had advanced the French line for about 4 km (2.5 mi), at a cost of 100,000 more French and British casualties than German. The French had attacked in Champagne with 35 divisions against the equivalent of 16 German divisions.
On the Champagne front, the Fourth, Second and Third armies had fired 2,842,400 field artillery and 577,700 heavy shells, which, with the consumption during the Third Battle of Artois in the north, exhausted the French stock of ammunition.
The Champagne Battlefront in 1915
French methods and equipment were insufficient for the demands of trench warfare, and a lull followed as the French rested the survivors of the offensive, replaced losses and accumulated more equipment and ammunition.
French artillery had been unable to destroy the German artillery, often situated on reverse slopes of the Champagne hills. Some French regiments attacked with bands playing and their regimental flags waving.
On the 22nd. October, Joffre claimed that the autumn offensive had resulted in important tactical gains, inflicted many casualties and achieved a moral superiority over the Germans, and that only a lack of artillery had led to the failure to achieve the strategic objectives of the offensive.
Joffre stated that in order to keep as many German troops as possible away from the Eastern Front, offensive operations had to continue, but troops in the front line were to be kept to the minimum over the winter and a new strategy was to be formulated.
The theoretical bases of the French offensives of 1915 had been collected in 'Purpose and Conditions of All Offensive Action' (16 April 1915) which was compiled from analyses of reports received from the Western Front since 1914.
The document contained instructions on infiltration tactics, rolling barrages and poison gas, which were to be used systematically in continuous battles to create rupture. Continuous battle was to be conducted by step-by-step advances, through successive German defensive positions.
Methodical attacks were to be made each time, and would inexorably consume German infantry reserves. The German defences would eventually collapse and make a breakthrough attack feasible. The slower, more deliberate methods, would conserve French infantry as they battered through the deeper defences built by the Germans since 1914.
In the autumn battles, the Allies had outnumbered the Westheer (German Army in the West) by 600 infantry battalions, but had not achieved a breakthrough, and after the first day of an attack, German reinforcements made one impossible.
Several German divisions had returned from the Eastern Front but were tired and of little value. The German commander in chief, General Erich von Falkenhayn had underestimated the possibility of an offensive, and kept the German Army High Command reserve spread all along the Western Front, rather than concentrating it in threatened areas.
French reviews of the offensive found that reserves had moved close to the front, ready to exploit a breakthrough, and had advanced on time.
However the leading divisions of French troops had become bunched up, lines of communication became blocked, and many were killed or injured during the hold up.
The communication failure meant that French commanders had been in ignorance of the situation, artillery co-ordination with the infantry had been poor, and rain had grounded French artillery-observation aircraft.
Many of the French commanders concluded that a breakthrough could not be forced in one attack, and that it would take several set-piece battles to make the defenders collapse and be unable to prevent a return to mobile operations.
The German report on the battle noted that unyielding defence of the most forward positions had failed several times. The French had severely damaged German field fortifications, and cut the barbed wire obstacles in front of them by long artillery bombardments.
The second position had not been broken into, and the 3rd. Army reported that the decision to construct it had been vindicated, since the French had to suspend their attacks until artillery had been moved forward, which took until the 4th. October.
The momentum of the initial breakthrough had not been maintained, because the French troops crowding forward had become disorganised, which made co-ordinated attacks impossible to arrange. French prisoners were reported to have said that there had been no methodical staging of the reserves to exploit a breakthrough, and concluded with the view that one might still be possible.
Lack of troops made it impossible for the Germans to respond with Gegenangriffe (methodical counter-attacks), but smaller Gegenstösse (hasty counter-attacks by troops remaining in the vicinity), had succeeded against French units weakened by losses, which had not had time to consolidate captured ground.
It was recommended that such reserves should be made available by reducing the number of German troops in the front line, as one man every 2.2–3.3 yd (2–3 m) was enough. Co-operation between all arms, assistance from neighbouring sectors and the exploitation of flanking moves had defeated the French offensive.
More intermediate strong points, built for all-round defence, were recommended between the first and second positions. Defence of the first position was still the intention, but deeper defences would dissipate the effect of a breakthrough and force the attackers to make numerous individual attacks, in areas where local knowledge and preparation of the ground would be advantageous to the defenders.
Observation posts should be made secure from attack, reconnaissance reports acted on promptly, and communication links were to be made as robust as possible. A wide field of fire was unnecessary and to be dispensed with, to make each part of the position defensible by placing it on reverse slopes, concealed from ground observation.
In his memoirs (1919), Falkenhayn wrote that the autumn battle showed that on the Western Front, quantity was not enough to defeat armies sheltering in field defences:
"The lessons to be deduced from the failure
of our enemies' mass attacks are decisive
against any imitation of their battle methods.
Attempts at a mass breakthrough, even with
the extreme accumulation of men and material,
cannot be regarded as holding out the prospects
of success".
Falkenhayn concluded that the plans, made earlier in 1915 for an offensive in France, were obsolete. He needed to resolve the paradoxical lessons of the war since 1914, to find a way to end it favourably for Germany, which culminated at the Battle of Verdun in 1916, when Falkenhayn tried to induce the French to repeat the costly failure of the Second Battle of Champagne.
Casualties of the Battle
The offensive had been disappointing for the French. Despite their new 'attack in echelon' they had only made quick progress during the time it took for the Germans to strip reserves from elsewhere and rush them up.
The French suffered 145,000 casualties, against 72,500 German casualties. The French had taken 25,000 prisoners and captured 150 guns.
